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NOTE 
BURDICK v. T AKUSHI: 
HAWAII'S BAN ON WRITE-IN VOTING 
IS CONSTITUTIONAL 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In Burdick v. Takushi,l the Supreme Court held that Ha-
waii's ban on write-in voting, when taken as part of the State's 
comprehensive election scheme, does not violate an individual's 
constitutional rights to freedom of expression or freedom of as-
sociation as they pertain to voting rights. 2 . 
This Note gives an overview of the case law as it pertains to 
voting rights and its relationship to the First Amendment, and 
analyzes the Supreme Court's application of that law to the spe-
cific facts in Burdick. 
II. FACTS 
Currently Hawaii's election laws do not provide for the cast-
ing of write-in votes in either primary or general elections.3 Alan 
Burdick, dissatisfied with the candidates presented on the 1986 
ballot, challenged these provisions in the United States District 
Court for the District of Hawaii. 4 The District Court sustained 
1. 112 S. Ct. 2059 (1992) (per White, J., joined by Rehnquist, C.J., and O'Connor, 
Scalia, Souter, and Thomas, JJ.; dissent by Kennedy, J., joined by Blackmun and Ste-
vens, JJ.). 
2. Id. at 2061. 
3. Id. at 2062. Burdick claimed his constitutional rights to freedom of expression 
and association were violated, and he attacked Hawaii's election laws on both state and 
federal constitutional grounds. Id. 
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his challenge and held the failure to accommodate write-in vot-
ing constituted a violation of Burdick's rights of freedom of ex-
pression and association. II 
The Ninth Circuit reversed, holding that Hawaii's ban on 
write-in voting did not violate the Constitution.6 The Supreme 
Court granted Burdick's petition for a writ of certiorari7 and 
affirmed.s 
III. BACKGROUND OF VOTING RIGHTS IN THE 
UNITED STATES 
A. HISTORICAL CONTEXT 
The right to vote is derived from the United States Consti-
tution.9 The First Amendment10 has been interpreted as as sur-
1. Does the Constitution of the State of Hawaii require Ha-
waii's election officials to permit the casting of write-in 
votes and require Hawaii's election officials to count and 
publish write-in votes? 
2. Do Hawaii's election laws require Hawaii's election offi-
cials to permit the casting of write-in votes and require' 
Hawaii's election officials to count and publish write-in 
votes? 
3. Do Hawaii's election laws permit, but not require, Ha-
waii's election officials to allow voters to cast write-in 
votes, and to count and publish write-in votes? 
Id. at 2062. The court's answer to all three questions was no. Id. 
5. Burdick v. Takushi, 737 F. Supp. 582, 591 (D. Haw. 1989). 
6. Burdick v. Takushi, 937 F.2d 415, 417 (9th Cir. 1991). "[The ban on write-in 
voting does not) impermissibly infringe [upon a voter's rights) in light of the ease of 
access to Hawaii's ballots, the alternatives available to Burdick for expressing his politi-
cal beliefs, the State's broad powers to regulate elections, and the specific interests ad-
vances by the State .... " Id. at 420-21. 
For an analysis of the Ninth Circuit's decision, see Elizabeth E. Deighton, Summary, 
Burdick v. Takushi: Upholding Hawaii's Ban on Write-in Voting, 22 Golden Gate U. L. 
Rev. 115 (1991). 
7. Burdick v. Takushi, 112 S. Ct. 635 (1991). 
8. Burdick v. Takushi, 112 S. Ct. 2059, 2061 (1992). 
9. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2 provides in part that "the House of Representatives shall 
be composed of Members chosen every second Year by the People of the several 
States .... " This provision has been interpreted to grant to persons qualified to vote a 
constitutional right to vote and to have their votes counted. United States v. Mosley, 238 
U.S. 383, 386 (1915); Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 17 (1964). The Wesberry court 
also stated that: "No right is more precious in a free country than that of having a voice 
in the election of those who make the laws under which, as good citizens, we must live. 
Other rights, even the most basic, are illusory if the right to vote is undermined." [d. 
10. U.S. CONST. amend. I reads: "Congress shall make no law respecting an establish-
ment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of 
2
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ing citizens' rights to cast a vote effectively and to associate for 
the advancement of political beliefs;ll the states may not burden 
these rights excessively.12 Under the Fourteenth Amendment no 
state may deprive any person of any rights of United States citi-
zens without due process of law;13 this Amendment has been in-
terpreted to incorporate First Amendment rights.14 
Until the late 1800's, all ballots in the United States were 
cast as write-in ballots.lIi Voters prepared their own ballots or 
used pre-printed ones prepared by political parties. Because 
there were no state-imposed restrictions on whose name could 
appear on the ballot, individuals could always vote for the candi-
dates of their choice.18 
The system of state-prepared ballots, known as the Austra-
lian ballot system, was introduced in the United States in 
1888.17 State-prepared ballots were considered a progressive re-
form to reduce fraudulent election practices.18 However, the new 
ballot system also operated to constrict voter choice of candi-
dates.19 In response to this problem, several early state courts 
recognized a right to cast write-in votes.20 These early decisions 
speech, or of the press; or the right of people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the 
Government for a redress of grievances." 
11. Burdick, 937 F.2d at 418. See also NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958); 
Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23 (1968). 
12. Burdick, 937 F.2d at 418; Williams, 393 U.S. at 30-31. The Williams court ex-
amined Ohio election laws that made it virtually' impossible for new political parties, or 
old parties with few members, to appear on the ballot for presidential electors. [d. at 30. 
The court held that the election laws resulted in a denial of equal protection and were 
unconstitutional. [d. at 31. 
13. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 2 reads, in part: 
No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge 
the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; 
nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or prop-
erty, without due process of law; nor deny to any person 
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. 
14. See, e.g., Williams, 393 U.S. at 30-31. 
15. See generally L.E. Fredman, The Australian Ballot: The Story of an American 
Reform (1968). 
16. [d.; Burdick, 112 S. Ct. at 2070 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
17. Burdick, 112 S. Ct. at 2070 (Kennedy, J., dissenting); Fredman, supra note 15. 
18. For example, the pre-printed ballots offered by political parties had often been 
in distinctive colors so that the party could determine whether one who had sold his vote 
had used the right ballot. Fredman, supra note 15, at 22. 
19. See Fredman, supra note 15; Burdick, 112 S. Ct. at 2070 (Kennedy, J., 
dissenting). 
20. See, e.g., Sanner v. Patton, 40 N.E. 290, 292-93 (Ill. 1895) (if write-in voting is 
3
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emphasized the voters' choice as paramount to administrative 
convenience; some voters cannot vote for the candidate of their 
choice without a write-in option.21 
B. MODERN DECISIONS 
1. Scope 
In Williams v. Rhodes~2 the Supreme Court recognized the 
interrelationship between the freedom of association and the 
right to vote.28 Although the Court did not explicitly define the 
nature of this interrelationship,24 it suggested that the freedom 
of association to form political parties or to advance political be-
liefs would be meaningless without some outlet at the polls.26 
The freedom of association may also refer directly to the voting 
process through the specific act of voting, as each citizen "associ-
ates" with the party or candidate of his or her choice.26 
In recent cases, whenever a state election scheme has been 
challenged on First Amendment grounds, the Court's analysis 
has consistently focused on the issue of freedom of association.27 
prohibited, the voter is deprived of the right of exercising his own choice; where this 
right is taken away "the boasted free ballot becomes a delusion."); Patterson v. Hanley, 
68 P. 821, 823 (Cal. 1902) (it seems to be agreed that the voter must be allowed the 
privilege of casting his vote for any person for any office by writing his name in the 
proper place.); and Oughton v. Black, 61 A. 346, 348 (Pa. 1905) (without a provision for 
the voter to make up an entire ticket of his or her own choice, the election as to that 
voter will not be equal, for that voter is unable to express his or her own individual will 
in his or her own way.). 
But see Lubin v. Pan ish, 415 U.S. 709, 716 (1974) where the Court recognized that 
not every voter can be assured 'that the candidate of his or her liking will be on the 
ballot. 
21. Burdick, 112 S. Ct. at 2070 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
22. 393 U.S. 23 (1968). 
23. Williams, 393 U.S. at 30. The Court stated that: "In the present situation the 
state laws place burdens on two different, although overlapping, kinds of rights - the 
right of individuals to associate for the advancement of political beliefs, and the right of 
qualified voters ... to cast their votes effectively." [d. 
24. Interestingly, in a dissenting opinion Justice Brennan explicitly stated: "The 
right to vote derives from the right of association that is the core of the First Amend-
ment." Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724, 756 (1974) (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
25. Williams, 393 U.S. at 31. See also Tashjian v. Republican Party of Conn., 479 
U.S. 208, 214-217 (1986) (voters' associational rights might be affected at the ballot box). 
26. Rosario v. Rockefeller, 410 U.S. 752, 756 (1972). See also Tashjian, 479 U.S. at 
217 ("[Ilmpingement upon the associational rights of the Party and its members occurs 
at the ballot box . . . ."). 
27. See Norman v. Reed, 112 S. Ct. 698 (1992); Tashjian. 479 U.S. at 208; Munro v. 
4
Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 23, Iss. 2 [1993], Art. 9
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol23/iss2/9
1993] BURDICK v. TAKUSHI 705 
The Court has also alluded to the corollary First Amendment 
freedom of expression as a facet of the act of voting.28 However, 
until Burdick the Court had not decided any ballot-access case29 
or voting rights case30 on this ground. 31 . 
In the past the Supreme Court has recognized the existence 
of write-in voting as an alternative method of ballot access.32 
However, the Court's appraisal of write-in voting as a constitu-
tional remedy in these circumstances has been inconsistent and 
nebulous.33 
2. Level of Scrutiny 
Certain processes govern who may run for office34 and how 
elections are conducted. 3C1 The Supreme Court has consistently 
Socialist Workers Party, 479 U.s. 189 (1986); Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780 
(1983); Illinois State Bd. of Elections v. Socialist Workers Party, 440 U.S. 173 (1979); 
American Party of Tex. v. White, 415 U.s. 767 (1974); Storer: 415 U.S. at 724; Lubin, 415 
U.S. at 709; Rosario, 410 U.S. at 752; Jenness v. Fortson, 403 U.s. 431 (1971); Williams, 
393 U.S. at 23. 
28. See Norman, 112 S. Ct. at 705; Illinois State Bd. of Elections, 440 U.S. at 184, 
186; Rosario, 410 U.S. at 764 (Brennan, J., dissenting); Jenness, 403 U.S. at 440. 
29. See Norman, 112 S. Ct. 698; Illinois State Bd. of Elections, 440 U.S. at 173; 
Jenness, 403 U.S. at 431. 
30. Rosario, 410 U.S. at 752. 
31. In one case the Court sustained on freedom of speech grounds a first amend-
ment challenge to a California statute that prohibited political parties from formally en-
dorsing candidates before a primary election. However, this election law did not directly 
relate to the actual process of voting. Eu v. San Francisco County Democratic Cent. 
Comm., 489 U.S. 214 (1989). 
32. See Anderson, 460 U.S. at 799, 808; Storer, 415 U.S. at 736; Lubin, 415 U.S. at 
719, 722; Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134, 137 (1972); Jenness, 403 U.S. at 438; Williams, 
393 U.S. at 37. 
33. In Anderson, 460 U.S. at 799, the majority stated "that a write-in provision ... 
would constitute 'an acceptable alternative' appears dubious at best." However, Justice 
Rehnquist's dissent noted that the Court has never squarely held that write-in votes 
were inadequate. Id. at 808. In an earlier concurrence Justice Blackmun regarded the 
write-in alternative as acceptable. Lubin, 415 U.S. at 722. However, in Williams, 393 
U.S. at 37, Justice Douglas stated in his concurrence that ~'write-ins are no substitute for 
a place on the ballot.!' Id. 
34. The United States Constitution contains several limitations on candidates for 
certain offices. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2 (congressional candidates restricted by a 
requirement that each be at least 25 years old with a minimum of seven years citizen-
ship); U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1 (presidential candidates restricted to those at least 35 years 
old who are natural born citizens). 
35. Numerous Supreme Court cases have upheld various restrictions placed upon 
the election process. See, e.g., Clements v. Fashing, 457 U.S. 957 (1982) (incumbent Jus-
tice of the Peace denied right to seek election to state legislature, and state and county 
5
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recognized that ballot restrictions may burden two distinct and 
fundamental rights: (1) the right of individuals to associate for 
the advancement of political beliefs, and (2) the right of quali-
tied voters to cast their votes effectively.s8 
Initially the Court applied strict scrutiny in its evaluation of 
restrictions on voting.37 The Court has demonstrated a prefer-
ence in recent years towards application of a more relaxed ra-
tional basis analysis. 88 
In Anderson v. Celebrezze89 the Supreme Court provided a 
new analytical process for determining the constitutionality of a 
specific provision in a state's elections laws under the First and 
Fourteenth Amendments. First the Court considers the charac-
ter and magnitude of the injury to the plaintiff's asserted First 
Amendment rights.40 Second, the Court identities and evaluates 
the State's interests that justify the burden its rule imposes.41 
Finally, balancing these conflicting interests enables the Court 
office holders deemed automatically resigned if they run for another elective office); 
Storer, 415 U.S. at 724 (state can require candidate to sever affiliation with political 
party one year prior to election in order to run as independent candidate); American 
Party of Tex. v. White, 415 U.S. 767 (1974) (state can deny place on ballot to frivolous 
candidate by requiring candidates to "demonstrate a significant, measurable quantum of 
community support"). 
36. Williams, 393 U.S. at 30; Illinois State Bd. of Elections v. Socialist Workers 
Party, 440 U.S. 173, 184 (1979); Munro v. Socialist Workers Party, 479 U.S. 189, 193 
(1986). 
37. Williams, 393 U.S. at 31. "When such vital individual rights are at stake, a State 
must establish that its classification is necessary to serve a compelling interest." Illinois 
State Bd. of Elections, 440 U.S. at 184; American Party of Tex., 415 U.S. at 780-781; 
Storer, 415 U.S. at 736. 
38. Burdick, 112 S. Ct. at 2063. 
[Tlo subject every voting regulation to strict scrutiny and to 
require that the regulation be narrowly tailored to advance a 
compelling state interest. .. would tie the hands of States 
seeking to assure that elections are operated equitably and ef-
ficiently .... Accordingly, the mere fact that a State's sys-
tem 'creates barriers ... tending to limit the field of candi-
dates from which voters might choose . . . does not of itself 
compel close scrutiny.' 
Id. See also Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 788 (1983); Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 
134, 143 (1972); McDonald v. Board of Election Comm'nrs of Chicago, 394 U.S. 802 
(1969). 
39. 460 U.S. 780 (1983). 
40. Id. at 789. 
41. Id. The legitimacy and strength of those state interests, as well as the extent to 
which they make it necessary to burden the plaintiff's rights, should be considered. Id. 
6
Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 23, Iss. 2 [1993], Art. 9
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol23/iss2/9
1993] BURDICK v. TAKUSHI 707 
to determine the constitutionality of the challenged provision of 
the state's election law.'2 
IV. THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT'S 
ANALYSIS 
A. MAJORITY OPINION 
1. Scrutiny Level Applicable 
In Burdick v. Takushi the Supreme Court began its analysis 
by refuting Burdick's contention that strict scrutiny should be 
applied in evaluating his claim under the First Amendment.,a 
The Court observed that ·election laws "will invariably impose 
some burden" on First Amendment rights."" As a result, apply-
ing strict scrutiny in every instance "would tie the hands of 
States seeking to assure that elections are operated equitably 
and efficiently."411 When there are severe restrictions on these 
rights, the Court may require that the regulation be narrowly 
drawn to advance a compelling state interest.'s However, where 
a regulation imposes merely "reasonable, non-discriminatory re-
strictions" upon a voter's constitutional rights, the State's "im-
portant regulatory interests are generally sufficient to justify" 
the burden on these rights.'" Ultimately, the Court reaffirmed 
and adopted the "more flexible standard" of Anderson to ana-
42.Id. 
43. Burdick v. Takushi, 112 S. Ct. 2059, 2063 (1992) ("Our cases do not so hold.") 
44. Id. at 2063. See also Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 788 (1983) (any elec-
tion law provision, "whether it governs the registration and qualifications of voters, the 
selection and eligibility of candidates, or the voting process itself, inevitably affects - at 
least to some degree - the individual's right to vote and his right to associate with others 
for political ends.") 
45. Burdick, 112 S. Ct. at 2063. See also Bullock v. Ca~ter, 405 U.S. 134, 143 (1972) 
(just because a State's system "creates barriers ... tending to limit the field of candi-
dates from which voters might choose . . . does not of itself compel strict scrutiny"); 
Anderson, 460 U.S. at 788 ("Although these rights of voters are fundamental, not all 
restrictions imposed by the States on candidates' eligibility for the ballot impose consti-
tutionally suspect burdens on voters' rights to associate or to choose among candi-
dates."); McDonald v. Board of Election Comm'rs of Chicago, 394 U.S. 802, 806-808 
(1969) ("Such an exacting approach is not necessary here .... "). 
46. Burdick, 112 S. Ct. at 2063. See also Norman v. Reed, 112 S. Ct. 698, 705 (1992) 
("To the degree that a State would thwart this interest [to create new political parties] 
by limiting the access of new parties to the ballot, . . . we have accordingly required any 
severe restriction to be narrowly drawn to advance a state interest of compelling 
importance. "). 
47. Burdick, 112 S. Ct. at 2063-64, citing Anderson, 460 U.S. at 788-89. 
7
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lyze this case.48 
2. Applying The Anderson Approach 
The Supreme Court examined the overall election scheme in 
Hawaii and elaborated on the three methods in Hawaii by which 
a candidate may appear on the primary ballot.49 The Court 
found that Hawaii's election laws provide relatively easy access 
to the ballot without the necessity for write-in voting. The Court 
stated the Hawaiian election system burdened only "those who 
fail to identify their candidate of choice until days before the 
primary. "110 Because the Court gave little weight to this interest 
in making a late decision in the past, III it concluded that any 
burden that might be imposed by Hawaii's ban on write-in vot-
ing would be extremely limited.1I2 
However, Burdick characterized his claim as a voting rights 
case, rather than a ballot-access case, and argued that the ballot-
access approach was inapposite. liS The Court refuted this argu-
ment on two grounds. lI• First it noted that voting rights and bal-
48. Burdick, 112 S. Ct. at 2063. 
49. Id. at 2064-65. The three identified methods permitting a candidate to appear 
on the primary ballot included the filing of a party petition, the established party route, 
and the designated nonpartisan ballot. The winner of each individual party primary 
gains a place on the November general election ballot. Id. at 2064. 
A nonpartisan candidate advances to the general election ballot if he or she receives 
at least ten percent of the primary vote or the number of votes that was sufficient to 
nominate a partisan candidate, whichever is lower. See Hustace v. Doi, 588 P.2d 915, 920 
(Haw. 1978). In the ten years before Burdick filed his action, only eight of 26 nonparti-
san candidates qualified for the November general election ballot. Burdick, 112 S. Ct. at 
2065. 
50. Burdick, 112 S. Ct. at 2065. The Court observed that "it can hardly be said that 
the laws at issue here unconstitutionally limit access to the ballot by party or indepen-
dent candidates or unreasonably interfere with the right of voters to associate and have 
candidates of their choice placed on the ballot." Id. 
51. Id. 
52. Id. The Court observed that "[tjo conclude otherwise might sacrifice the politi-
cal stability of the system of the State, with profound consequences for the entire citi-
zenry, merely in the interest of particular candidates and their supporters having instan-
taneous access to the ballot." Id. 
53. Id. Burdick argued that Hawaii's ban on write-in voting "deprive[dj him of the 
opportunity to cast a meaningful ballot, condition[edj his electoral participation upon 
the waiver of his First Amendment right to remain free from espousing positions that he 
does not support, and discriminate[dj against him based on the content of the message 
he [soughtj to convey through his vote." Id. 
54. Burdick, 112 S.Ct. at 2065-66. 
8
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lot-access rights are practically indistinguishable.1I1I The Court 
then observed that the main purpose of elections is to narrow 
the field of candidates to the chosen ones, not to provide a fo-
rum for generalized political expression.1I6 In the past the Court 
has "repeatedly upheld reasonable, politically neutral regula-
tions that have the effect of channeling expressive activity at the 
polls."117 
In concluding its examination of the burdens placed on the 
right to vote by Hawaii's ban on write-in voting, the Court held 
that "in light of the adequate ballot access afforded" under Ha-
waii's election scheme, "the State's ban on write-in voting im-
poses only a limited burden on voters' rights to make free 
choices and to associate politically through the vote."IIS 
. The Court next addressed the interests asserted by the 
State of Hawaii in justifying the ban on write-in voting. The 
State claimed that the prohibition avoids "sore loser" candida-
cies,1I9 and that the prohibition protects the integrity of its elec-
tion laws.60 The State also asserted its interest in eliminating 
"party raiding. "61 The Court agreed that these interests were 
55. Id., citing Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134, 143 (1972). The Court noted that "the 
rights of voters and the rights of candidates do not lend themselves to neat separation." 
Id. 
56. Burdick, 112 S. Ct. at 2066, citing Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724, 735 (1974). 
57. Burdick, 112 S. Ct. at 2066. See, e.g., Munro v. Socialist Workers Party, 479 U.S. 
189, 199 (1986) (upholding a Washington statute requiring that a minor party candidate 
receive at least one percent of all votes cast for that office in the State's primary election 
in order to gain placement on the general election ballot). 
58. Burdick, 112 S. Ct. at 2066. 
59. Id. A "sore loser" candidacy occurs when a nominee loses a primary election and 
later gathers enough support to beat the primary winner in the general election. See 
Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 784 n.2 (1983); Storer, 415 U.S. at 735. The Su-
preme Court has previously held that preventing such candidacies is a legitimate inter-
est. See Munro, 479 U.S. at 196 (states have a compelling interest in ensuring that uiue-
strained factionalism does not damage the election process). 
60. Under Hawaii election law, a candidate who is unopposed in a primary is auto-
matically seated in the general election. See Haw. Rev. Stat. §§ 12-41, 12-42. Allowing 
write-in votes would nullify the statute because a candidate unopposed in a primary by' 
any candidate running on any other ticket could still be challenged in the general elec-
tion by a write-in candidate. Burdick, 112 S. Ct. at 2067. 
61. "Party raiding" (also known as "cross-over voting") occurs when "voters in sym-
pathy with one party designate themselves as voters of another party so as to influence 
or determine the results of the other party's primary." Rosario v. Rockefeller, 410 U.S. 
752, 760 (1972). 
Burdick argued that "party raiding" was not a legitimate interest in light of Ha-
waii's open primary. However, Hawaii requires party candidates to be members of the 
9
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legitimate. S2 
In balancing the burdens placed on voting rights against 
Hawaii's interests in its election scheme, the Court noted that 
because the burden on voters was slight, the State "need not 
establish a compelling interest" to justify the ban on write-in 
voting.ss The Court determined that the State's ban on write-in 
voting was a "reasonable way" to protect the State's "legitimate 
interests" and held that Hawaii's ban on write-in voting was 
constitutional.6• However, in upholding Hawaii's voting law the 
Court went one step further. The Court broadly asserted that 
"when a State's ballot access laws pass constitutional muster as 
imposing only reasonable burdens on First and Fourteenth 
Amendment rights - as do Hawaii's election laws - a prohibition 
on write-in voting will be presumptively valid."611 
B. DISSENT 
In dissent Justices Kennedy, Blackmun and Stevens dis-
agreed with two major aspects of the majority opinion. The dis-
senting justices first disputed the majority's broad presumption 
that write-in bans are permissible if a state's ballot access laws 
are otherwise constitutional.66 The dissent also argued with the 
specific conclusion reached by the majority as to the constitu-
tionality of Hawaii's ban on write-in voting~67 
The dissent first reviewed the overall election system in Ha-
waii and determined that Hawaii's ballot-access system posed a 
significant impediment to third-party68 and independent candi-
political party and does not allow candidates to file nominating papers both as a party 
candidate and a nonpartisan candidate. Haw. Rev. Stat. §§ 12-3(a)(7), 12-3(c) (1985). 
Thus, "party raiding" is a realistic possibility that the state may guard against. Burdick, 
112 S. Ct. at 2067. 
62. Burdick, 112 S. Ct. at 2066-67. 
63. Id. at 2067. 
64.Id. 
65. Id. The Court was hasty to add, though, that its decision in Burdick was "not to 
be read to discourage such [write-in) provisions." Id. at 2067 n.11. 
66. Burdick, 112 S. Ct. at 2070-71 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
67. Id. at 2072. 
68. Id. at 2068. The dissent noted that new parties must file their petitions for pri-
mary ballot placement five months before the primary, which is "a condition difficult for 
many small parties to meet" due to organizational constraints. Id. See Haw. Rev. Stat. § 
11-62(a)(1) (1985 and Supp. 1991). 
10
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dates.69 Strong evidence was presented that in Hawaii many can-
didates run unopposed,70 and significant numbers of voters cast 
blank ballots in those uncontested races rather than vote for the 
sole candidate on the ballot.71 From this evidence the dissent 
concluded that a significant number of Hawaiian voters were un-
able to participate in Hawaiian elections "in a meaningful man-
ner" due to the write-in voting ban.72 
Next, the dissent examined the legal principles involved and 
the appropriate scrutiny level that should be accorded to the 
Hawaii write-in ban. The dissent found that a test stricter than 
rational basis scrutiny should have been applied in this case7S 
because the injury to voters' rights was more than slight. 74 
The dissent characterized the Court's presumption of valid-
ity in its examination of Hawaii's ballot-access system as "circu-
lar" because this presumption failed to address the ban on 
write-in voting as a factor in determining the adequacy of the 
ballot-access laws.71i The result is that "the State needs to de-
69. Burdick, 112 S. Ct. at 2068-69 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). Between 1982 and 1992 
only eight independent candidates succeeded in advancing to the general election. [d. at 
2069. The dissent noted that getting ballot placement is not as "onerous" for indepen-
dent candidates, as they must submit 15 to 25 signatures at least 60 days before the 
primary. [d. at 2068. See Haw. Rev. Stat. §§ 12-3 to 12-7 (1985 and Supp. 1991). 
The dissent reasoned that voters may vote in only a partisan or nonpartisan (inde-
pendent) primary, but usually there are not independent candidates for each race. Thus, 
if a voter felt strongly about an independent candidate in one particular race, that voter 
would be precluded from having a voice in the other races if he or she chose the nonpar-
tisan primary. When coupled with the fact that the primary election is often dispositive 
of many races in Hawaii, the dissent found that voters choosing independent candidates 
would often be precluded from "participating in what wiJI be the dispositive election for 
many offices." Burdick, 112 S. Ct. at 2068-69 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). See Haw. Rev. 
Stat. § 12-42 (1985) and supra note 60 for discussion of automatic seating of candidates 
running unopposed in primary elections. 
70. Burdick, 112 S. Ct. at 2068 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). For example, in the 1986 
general election 33 percent of the candidates for state legislative office were unopposed. 
[d. 
71. [d. at 2068. In 1990, 27 percent of voters who voted in other races did not cast 
voters in uncontested state Senate races; 29 percent of voters did not cast votes in un-
contested state house races. Even in the 1990 contested races; 12 to 13 percent of the 
voters cast blank ballots. [d. 
72. [d. 
73: [d. at 2069. The dissent agreed with the Court's conclusion that the Anderson 
analysis was applicable. [d. 
74. [d. at 2070. "For those who are affected by write-in bans, the infringement on 
their right to vote for the candidate of their choice is total. " [d. 
75. [d. at 2071. Past decisions have held up other forms of ballot-access restriction 
11
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fend only its ballot access laws, and not the write-in restriction 
itself. "76 
The dissent felt that Hawaii failed to justify its write-in vot-
ing ban by not "putting forth the precise interests that are 
served by the ban."77 The dissent dismissed the interests ad-
vanced by the State as less important than the majority had de-
termined.78 Although the dissenting justices conceded that 
preventing sore loser candidacies was the most legitimate of the 
State's interests, they concluded that the write-in voting ban 
was "very overinclusive. "79 
The dissent criticized the State's argument in support of its 
policy of seating as officeholders the unopposed victors in pri-
mary elections as making "no sense."60 They also remarked that 
the State's asserted interest in preventing party raiding was 
"ironic" because of the State's open primary system.61 Then the 
dissent blasted as "backward" the state's interest in promoting 
an informed electorate, suggesting that voters supporting inde-
pendent candidates are often more informed because of the per-
in part because a write-in option was available to voters. See, e.g., Jenness v. Fortson, 
403 U.S. 431, 438 (1971) ("Unlike Ohio, Georgia freely provides for write-in votes."); 
Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724, 736 n.7 (1974) ("Moreover, we note that the independent 
candidate who cannot qualify for the ballot may nevertheless resort to the write-in alter-
native provided by California law .... "). 
76. Burdick, 112 S. Ct. at 2071 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
77.Id. 
78.Id. 
79. Id. at 2071 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). The dissent thought a write-in voting ban 
for just the general election might be justified by the interest in preventing sore loser 
candidacies, but the ban was unacceptable as applied to both primary and general elec-
tions.Id. 
80. Id. The dissent agreed with the petitioner that because Hawaii abolished the 
general election for those particular races, there is no chance to cast a write-in vote in 
opposition at either the primary or general election. "If anything, the argument cuts the 
other way because this provision makes it all the more important to allow write-in voting 
in the primary elections because primaries are often dispositive." Id. 
81. Id. at 2072 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). An open primary allows all registered vot-
ers to choose which primary to vote in, regardless of what party affiliation is shown on 
the voter's registration. See, e.g., Haw. Rev. Stat. § 12-31 (1985), which states: 
No person eligible to vote in any primary or special primary 
election shall be required to state a party preference or non-
partisanship as a condition of voting. . .. In any primary or 
special election . . . a voter shall be entitled to select and to 
vote the ballot of anyone party or nonpartisan, regardless of 
which ballot the voter voted in any preceding primary or spe-
cial primary election. 
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sonal effort required of those voters to learn about candidates 
who do not conduct "visible campaigns."82 Finally, the dissent 
dismissed the 'State's interest of combatting fraud and enforcing 
nomination requirements as inapplicable to write-in voting.83 
The dissent concluded that "the State's proffered justifications 
for the write-in prohibition are not sufficient under any standard 
to justify the significant impairment of the constitutional rights 
of voters . . . . "84, 
V. CRITIQUE 
A. REJECTION OF FOURTH CIRCUIT VIEW 
The Supreme Court implicitly recognized that the Ninth 
Circuit's holding in Burdick v. Takushi83 was inconsistent with 
the Fourth Circuit's decision in Dixon v. Maryland State Ad-
ministrative Board of Election Laws.86 
The Dixon court held that the casting and counting of 
write-in votes implicates fundamental rights.87 The Fourth Cir-
cuit considered that a vote is still constitutionally significant 
even if cast for a long-shot or fictional candidate, because the 
right to vote for the candidate of one's choice includes the right 
to say that no candidate is acceptable.88 Consequently, the 
Fourth Circuit concluded that the expression of this viewpoint, 
in the form of a write-in vote, is a constitutionally protected 
right.89 While the Court acknowledged the existence of the 
82. Burdick, 112 S. Ct. at 2072 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
83. Id. The state did not explain how write-in voting presented a risk of fraud in 
today's elections. Also, the interest of ensuring that elected candidates are qualified for 
office would be much better served by requiring a declaration of candidacy and verifica-
tion of qualifications be filed a few days before the election as done in many other states. 
Id. 
84.Id. 
85. 937 F.2d 415 (9th Cir. 1991). 
86. 878 F.2d 776 (4th Cir. 1989J. 
87. Dixon, 878 F.2d at 782. The challenged election law in Dixon required candi-
dates for certain city offices to pay a $150 filing fee in order to qualify as an "official" 
write-in candidate. Only official write-in candidates could have the votes cast for them 
publicly reported and attain office. Id. 
88. Id. The Dixon court further reasoned that write-in votes are used in the hope, 
however slim, that the votes will be successful in propagating the voter's views to in-
crease his or her influence. Id, 
89. Id. There was no petition for a writ of certiorari filed with the Supreme Court in 
the Dixon case. 
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Dixon decision,90 it failed to discuss the Dixon holding or sug-
gest what, if anything, remained valid in the Dixon holding. 
B. PRESUMPTIVE VALIDITY OF WRITE-IN VOTING BANS 
More disturbing than the Court's avoidance of Dixon is the 
Court's broad assertion that a State's ban on write-in voting will 
be presumptively valid when the State's ballot-access laws pass 
"constitutional muster."91 Moreover, the dissent was correct in 
its statement that this presumption is "circular."92 The Court's 
presumption of validity rests on the fact that the overall ballot-
access scheme is constitutional. 93 Yet a ballot-access scheme 
must be examined in its entirety, which necessarily includes the 
availability of write-in voting.9' As the dissent clearly points out, 
the majority fails to acknowledge this fault in its reasoning.911 
VI. CONCLUSION 
In Burdick v. Takushi96 the Supreme Court held that Ha-
waii's ban on write-in voting is not an infringement of a voter's 
constitutional rights to freedom of political speech and associa-
tion.97 The Court did not directly address whether there is a 
fundamental right to cast a write-in vote. However, by implica-
tion it appears there is no such fundamental right as was sug-
gested in Dixon. 
By not following the Fourth Circuit's holding in Dixon, the 
Supreme Court avoided the opportunity to define specifically 
how our fundamental rights of free political speech and associa-
tion are related to our right to vote. Additionally, the Court's 
trend appears to whittle away at voting rights.98 The Ninth Cir-
cuit's holding, affirmed by the Supreme Court, has already been 
90. Burdick, 112 S. Ct. at 2062. 
91. Burdick, 112 S. Ct. at 2067. 
92. [d. at 2071 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
93. [d. at 2063. 
94. [d. at 2071 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
95. [d. 
96. 112 S. Ct. 2059 (1992). 
97. [d. at 2061. 
98. See supra notes 34 through 42 and accompanying text regarding the more re-
laxed standard of scrutiny applied in recent voting rights cases. 
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followed by at least one federal court.99 Furthermore, at least 25 
states currently ban or restrict write-in voting.1oo Hopefully 
those states still permitting write-in voting will maintain their 
present electoral schemes. However, the Court's assertion that it 
"does not disapprove" of such write-in voting schemes in gen-
eraPOI does not sound encouraging. 
Elizabeth E. Deighton* 
99. See New Progressive Party v. Colon, 779 F. Supp. 646, 659 n.14 (D.P.R. 1991): 
"Concerning plaintiffs' allegation that Act 85 precludes a write-in vote, the Court finds 
[Burdick] dispositive. 'Although the voter has a protected right to voice his opinion and 
attempt to influence others, he has no guarantee that he can voice any particular opinion 
through the ballot box.' " 
100. Statutory prohibitions on write-in voting exist in three states. See Nev. Rev. 
Stat. § 24-293.270(2) (1987); Okla. Stat. tit. 26, § 7-127(1) (Supp. 1989); S.D. Codified 
Laws Ann. § 12-16-1 (1982 and Supp. 1990). 
For statutory write-in voting bans in primary elections see Alaska Stat. § 15.25.070 
(1988); Fla. Stat. § 101.011(6) (1989); Ga. Code Ann. § 34A-1124 (Harrison Supp. 1988); 
Md. Ann. Code, art. 33, § 5-3(0 (1986); Minn. Stat. § 204B.36(2) (1988); N.C. Gen. Stat. 
§ 163-151(6)(e) (1987); Tex. Elec. Code Ann. § 172.112 (Vernon 1986); Wis. Stat. § 
8.17(3)(a) (1987-88). 
Preregistration by potential write-in candidates is mandated in at least sixteen 
states. See Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 16-312 (1984 and Supp. 1989; Ark. stat. Ann. § 7-5-
205 (Supp. 1989); Cal. Elec. Code § 7300 (West 1977 and Supp. 1990); Colo. Rev. Stat. 
§ 1-4-1001 (1980 and Supp. 1989); Conn. Gen. Stat. § 9-373(a) (1989); Ga. Code Ann. 
§ 34A-915 (Harrison Supp. 1988); Idaho Code § 34-702A (Supp. 1989); Mo. Rev. Stat. 
§ 115.453(4) (1986); Mont. Code Ann. § 13-10-211 (1989); N.M. Stat. ·Ann. § 1-12-19.1 
(1985); N.Y. Elec. Law § 6-164 (McKinney 1978 and Supp. 1990); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. 
§ 3513.041 (Anderson 1988); Or. Rev. Stat. § 249.007 (1989); Utah Code Ann. § 20-7-20 
(1984 and Supp. 1990); Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 29.51.170 (1965 and Supp. 1990); Wis. 
Stat. § 8.16(2) (1987-88). 
See generally Recent Development: First Amendment - Voters' Speech Rights -
Federal District Courts Mandate Availability of Write-In Votes, 104 HARv. L. REV. 657 
(1990). 
101. Burdick, 112 S. Ct. at 2067 n.11. 
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